Quel était l'objectif du test de l'eau poussiéreuse (ou "amère") Numbers 5?
Le serment/sacrifice "eau poussiéreuse" (Num. 5) est l'une des bonnes lois de YHWH qui est souvent déformée. Il permet à une femme de se laver de toute accusation calomnieuse. Le mari (comme indiqué dans la loi : Nb. 5:13) n'a pas de témoins de l'adultère présumé. Il agit probablement sur la base d'une rumeur - le genre de rumeur qui est facile à lancer, et dévastatrice pour la réputation d'une femme, si on la croit. La loi biblique permet à la femme innocente de réfuter une telle fausseté sans risque pour elle, et pour le prix d'un petit sacrifice alimentaire d'orge (Nb. 5:15). Ce type de cérémonie publique ne serait pas entrepris à la légère par un mari. Ce serait un grand risque pour sa réputation, s'il n'était pas assez sûr de sa culpabilité.
The temple dust/ink/water concoction which the wife was required to drink would have been harmless, in itself. Ancient inks were typically made of lamp black (carbon) or iron oxide, and gum arabic. Basically harmless, in such small, dilute amounts.
This test, often called the "bitter water" test, has been compared to a trial by ordeal. It is the opposite of an ordeal, though, in the sense that the water mixed with dust was harmless in and of itself (and probably more healthy than the distilled, demineralized water which people drink on a regular basis nowadays), and required divine intervention to cause harm. Ordeals as used in man's law were typically actions that were harmful by nature (eg. drowning, fighting, touching boiling water), requiring divine intervention to guide the outcome or prevent the harm. Ordeals attempted to force God's hand in revealing a judicial outcome. In this sense, they are more akin to Gideon's use of the fleece (which is certainly not a pattern that we find encouraged in scripture).
We do find historical instances of Israelite kings seeking answers directly from YHWH, but this often seems to have been through the Urim and Thummim, which are scripturally obscure. There is also the case of the disciples casting lots for Judas' replacement (Acts 1:16-22). Again, the normativity of this method of decision-making is questionable. In any case, there was no legal issue (e.g. a person's life) at stake in the disciples' decision. Both of the candidates they were considering were fully-qualified and (from a human standpoint) equally good.
The fact that the dusty water test involves a food sacrifice might warn us to evaluate it as abolished with other Sinai sacrificial laws. Certainly, the involvement of an Aaronic priest and the sacrificial element do not seem to carry into the New Covenant. However, these features do not seem to be necessary to the ontology of this case.
What about the "dust of the temple"? Is there something special (holy, perhaps?) about the dust of the temple which makes the test especially effective? Possibly, but my intuition is that the dust was merely symbolic, and dependent upon a physical temple being present. For a people in which (nearly) every other part of their sacrificial system was tied to the temple/tabernacle, it would be surprising if we did not see this physical connection with the temple.
I submit that the general equity, "active ingredients" in the dusty water test are:
- the public, legal, self-maledictory oath of the wife (v. 22) -- inviting YHWH to act in judgment
- the willingness of YHWH to punish someone who sins in a high-handed way by making such a false oath
There is no reason to believe that #2 above is no longer true in the New Covenant age. So the two remaining questions are:
- Is a wife living in the New Covenant age allowed to make a legal oath/affirmation of her innocence?
- Can a wife be forced by her husband to make such an oath?
Encore une fois, je ne vois pas pourquoi nous pourrions nier le point 1 ci-dessus. Qu'en est-il du n°2?
Il n'est pas évident pour moi qu'une femme puisse être forcée à faire un tel serment même dans le cadre de l'alliance du Sinaï. Un tel serment est une forme de témoignage, et dans aucun autre cas juridique, on ne peut exiger d'une personne qu'elle témoigne contre elle-même. Il me semble qu'une femme avait la possibilité de refuser simplement la demande du mari. Ce refus n'aurait pas eu d'implications civiles ou juridiques, mais il aurait pu être utilisé par le mari comme une justification suffisante (avec d'autres preuves circonstancielles qui l'ont amené à soupçonner l'infidélité en premier lieu) pour donner à sa femme un acte de divorce (Deut. 24:1). Rien ne pouvait empêcher le mari de le faire (sauf s'il avait lui-même commis un péché antérieur qui empêchait le divorce : Deut. 22:14-19), et si l'alliance du mariage avait effectivement été rompue par un acte d'infidélité de la part de la femme, alors l'acte du mari de la "repousser" ne serait pas un péché de sa part (Matt. 19:9).
